Autocratic Legalism Kim Lane Scheppele Upd May 2026
This article explores the architecture of Scheppele’s theory, its empirical grounding in Central Europe, its evolution through the Trump and Orbán eras, and its urgent implications for liberal democracies today. While the keyword often attaches “UPenn” to her name due to her influential years at Penn’s Law School and the Andrea Mitchell Center for the Study of Democracy, Scheppele’s institutional home is now Princeton. But her intellectual DNA remains deeply woven into the legal realism of the Philadelphia-New York corridor. In her landmark 2018 article, Autocratic Legalism (University of Chicago Law Review), Scheppele draws a sharp line between two familiar forms of governance. The first is authoritarian legality —the brute-force law of dictatorships, where courts are rubber stamps and legal forms are mere window dressing for raw power. The second is liberal legality —the ideal of the rule of law, where general, public, prospective, and consistent norms bind both citizen and sovereign.
earned her J.D. and Ph.D. (in anthropology) from the University of Chicago. She taught at the University of Michigan and then at the University of Pennsylvania Law School for a transformative period from 1998 to 2005, where she was the Stephen A. Schiller Professor of Law and a key figure in the interdisciplinary Law & Society movement. During those years, she wrote foundational work on constitutional identity, emergency powers, and Central European transitions—work that directly foreshadowed autocratic legalism. autocratic legalism kim lane scheppele upd
First, Some scholars argue that Scheppele’s framework risks labeling any aggressive, partisan use of legal power as “autocratic.” If a democratic majority packs a court (as FDR threatened), is that autocratic legalism? Scheppele answers with a distinction of entrenchment versus policy . FDR wanted to change policy; Orbán wanted to change the ability of future majorities to ever change policy again . The latter is autocratic legalism; the former is constitutional hardball within a still-competitive system. earned her J
Then came the 2010s. Observers watched in bewilderment as elected leaders in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and eventually the United States began dismantling democratic guardrails not with bayonets, but with briefs. They amended constitutions. They packed courts. They rewrote electoral laws. They declared emergencies and cited legal texts. To the casual eye, the machinery of law was still humming. But the destination had changed. The latter is autocratic legalism